Diplomacy and Health: The End of the Utilitarian Era by Kevany, Sebastian & Matthews, Marcus
Full list of authors’ affiliations is available at the end of the article.
Diplomacy and Health:  The End of the Utilitarian Era
Sebastian Kevany1*, Marcus Matthews2
Abstract
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), as a system of allocative efficiency for global health programs, is an influential 
criterion for resource allocation in the context of diplomacy and inherent foreign policy decisions therein. This is 
because such programs have diplomatic benefits and costs that can be uploaded from the recipient and affect the 
broader foreign policy interests of the donor and the diplomacy landscape between both parties. These diplomatic 
implications are vital to the long-term success of both the immediate program and any subsequent programs; 
hence it is important to articulate them alongside program performance, in terms of how well their interrelated 
interventions were perceived by the communities served. Consequently, the exclusive focus of cost-effectiveness 
on medical outcomes ignores (1) the potential non-health benefits of less cost-effective interventions and (2) the 
potential of these collateral gains to form compelling cases across the interdisciplinary spectrum to increase the 
overall resource envelope for global health. The assessment utilizes the Kevany Riposte’s “K-Scores” methodology, 
which has been previously applied as a replicable evaluation tool1 and assesses the trade-offs of highly cost-
effective but potentially “undiplomatic” global health interventions. Ultimately, we apply this approach to selected 
HIV/AIDS interventions to determine their wider benefits and demonstrate the value alternative evaluation 
and decision-making methodologies. Interventions with high “K-Scores” should be seriously considered for 
resource allocation independent of their cost-effectiveness. “Oregon Plan” thresholds2 are neither appropriate nor 
enforceable in this regard while “K-Score” results provide contextual information to policy-makers who may have, 
to date, considered only cost-effectiveness data. While CEA is a valuable tool for resource allocation, its use as a 
utilitarian focus should be approached with caution. Policy-makers and global health program managers should 
take into account a wide range of outcomes before agreeing upon selection and implementation.
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Background
A Challenge to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
In recent decades, cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) has 
become increasingly important in both technical and allocative 
resource allocation decisions for global health interventions.3 
This includes, but is not limited to, the determination of which 
programs to support, in which places and focusing on which 
populations, based on cost per unit of currency involved 
against outcomes such as HIV/AIDS infections averted, 
quality-adjusted life years gained, or disability-adjusted life 
years lost.4 Such utilitarian approaches, while valuable in 
the technical efficiency realm, have been considered short-
sighted and narrow in “real–world” scenarios, especially 
those in which cultural, social, religious, diplomatic, equity, 
accessibility, and political considerations have to be taken 
into account.5 How does CEA decision-maker respond, for 
example, to situations in which tides of popular support for 
less cost-effective interventions, such as antiretroviral therapy 
for HIV/AIDS, result in an increase in funding for global 
health,6 and thereby potentially saving more lives than if 
optimal utilitarian interventions were exclusively used?
Global Health Intervention Value
Assessing the relative value or worth of global health 
interventions begins with the development of hypothetical 
comparisons. A range of highly cost-effective interventions 
for HIV/AIDS are, of course, already in existence.7 To date, 
few of these have been formally assessed from a foreign policy 
perspective.8 However, certain features of contemporary 
interventions suggest possible foreign policy advantages or 
threats.1 In the case of HIV/AIDS, behavioral or surgical 
interventions are frequently in conflict with local traditions 
and societal norms; from the social, religious or cultural 
viewpoints.9 While such interventions may be highly cost-
effective, how much attention from their advocates has gone in 
to the challenges to local health traditions — notwithstanding 
possible downstream health effects — in the developing 
world’s primary healthcare context? Similarly, the promotion 
of other HIV/AIDS interventions has, to date, paid little heed 
to the challenges that this brings about on the non-health 
level.10 
Diplomatic Versus Economic Value
To assess the total utility of global health interventions and 
capture the wider interrelated community health and non-
health benefits, which is of real interest to program donors; it 
is necessary to consider a quantitative model that is designed 
to capture the broader socio-economic implications. The 
“Kevany Riposte” is a recently-developed and published CEA 
tool that assigns numerical values to the diplomatic worth (or 
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threats) of global health interventions.1 The Kevany Riposte 
incorporates the following 10 assessment criteria when a 
particular intervention’s inherent design is being analyzed 
(Table 1).
In each instance, the specific criterion is graded on a 
mathematical benefit-threat spectrum, which results in a 
“K-Score” that quantifies the potential risks and rewards of 
the criteria that constitute a particular intervention. When 
the K-Scores are summated, they are contextualized against 
the “Kevany Threshold” (KT), which is an effectiveness 
quorum that can be optimized depending upon the donor’s 
effectiveness tolerance. The K-Score’s inherent threat-benefit 
calculations are, therefore, mathematically rated accordingly 
(Table 2).
The result from the application of the Kevany Riposte is 
an overall clearer understanding of an intervention’s cost-
effectiveness and potential externalities. Thus, the Kevany 
Riposte and the resulting positioning with respect to the 
KT can offer a much better understanding of a particular 
intervention’s diplomatic value to a donor’s philosophy, 
national values, and overall foreign policy agenda.
Balancing Diplomatic and Economic Value With the Kevany 
Riposte
The assessment of global health interventions that fail to 
achieve the KT results in a hypothetical model that (1) forces 
an intervention’s rejection from the resource allocation 
pantheon or (2) necessitates the intervention’s modification 
to adhere to the diplomatic criteria listed above. In practice, 
this would involve the application of a KT to a selection, or 
the entire range, of HIV/AIDS interventions currently in 
use. Such a process would take place both via desk reviews 
and at the field level, focusing on those classifications and 
sub-classifications under which the intervention registered 
potential, moderate or severe diplomatic threats. For example, 
intervention timelines and the feasibility of long-term 
handover to local actors would be guaranteed, in advance 
of intervention implementation, to be within the capacity 
of local actors in the long-term.11 Similarly, there is an 
increasing consensus that global heath interventions which 
stand to challenge local healthcare as well as other traditions 
or practices should be designed and delivered on a highly 
collaborative and interactive basis with recipient countries, 
local communities and other stakeholders. 
The result of such diplomatic “screening” procedures for global 
health programs will be to ensure that, on a prima facie basis, 
all interventions are both cost-effective and diplomatically-
effective – ideally, without sacrificing either health or non-
health gains, but nonetheless providing analytical tools to 
respond to ethical dilemmas related to situations in which 
such trade-offs have to occur. The combination of such 
considerations stands to improve program implementation, 
uptake, utilization, donor support, and recipient recognition 
and appreciation of donor efforts.12 Let us consider a concrete 
worked example showing a plausible (not clearly unethical) 
cost-effective intervention that can be rejected (or severely 
Table 1. Criteria and Non-exhaustive Outline of Themes Assessed and Questions Evaluated
Criterion Description of Themes (Not Exhaustive)
Neutrality How tailored is the intervention to the recipient’s society, religious practices, cultural values?
Visibility How visible are the source funding organizations?
Sustainability Can the intervention be financially supported by the recipient after the funding period? Can the intervention be transferred?
Effectiveness
Has the intervention and its results been scientifically validated? Are there measures in place to deal with constrained 
budgets? 
Adaptability
Can the intervention respond to unforeseen health needs? Does the intervention have positive externalities? Have 
communities had an input?
Accountability
Does the intervention produce regular results from communities that are verifiable? Is an M&E philosophy prevalent and is 
corruption combatted?
Partnerships
Does the intervention promote institutional partnerships: national and regional? Do intervention staff receive guidance on 
international standards?
Economic, Political, 
Environmental and Social 
Effects
Does the intervention contribute to wider economic growth? Does the intervention promote political stability? Does the 
intervention increase dignity and self-worth amongst recipients? Does the intervention utilize public space appropriately? 
Does the intervention damage the environment?
Interdependence
Is the intervention coordinated with the aims of other programs? Does the intervention complement or operate in tandem 
with other interventions?
Training
Have intervention staff been trained? Is the training qualification recognized? Have staff received training to deal with 
cultural and religious customs? 
Abbreviation: M&E, Metaphysics and Epistemology.
Table 2. Scoring and Results for K-Score Classifications
Classification Explanation Score
Highly advantageous Intervention program displays clear and significant value from the diplomatic or foreign policy perspective. +2 
Moderately advantageous Intervention program displays some strengths in advancing diplomatic or foreign policy goals. +1 
Acceptable, neutral, or not relevant Intervention attains diplomatic or foreign policy minimum standards. 0 
Not applicable Intervention program does not operate in the context of this classification (or sub-classification). 0 
Potential moderate threat Intervention program may constitute a threat to diplomatic or foreign policy goals. −1 
Potential significant threat




International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2017, 6(4), 191–194 193
modified) and swapped out based on diplomatic criteria.
Methods
Comparing Diplomatically and Economically-Effective 
Choices
Our example focuses on, firstly, a global health intervention 
for HIV/AIDS that is effective, efficacious and cost-effective; 
in both the controlled (trial) and applied (field) contexts 
(“Intervention A”), and that is implemented based on surgical 
procedures (eg, voluntary adult male circumcision). The 
context is a low-income, developing country setting with 
limited educational opportunities and high levels of religious 
practices and awareness, as well as a significant focus on 
traditional (even tribal) values related to sexual health and 
gender norms. These norms are not considered damaging 
from western perspectives; rather, they are neutral in terms 
of social progressiveness, recognizing the multifarious global 
health interventions that address, in concert with each other, 
both health and (for example) oppressive gender practices 
that are to be welcomed and supported. Our cost-effectiveness 
ratio for this intervention is approximately US$3000 per HIV 
infection averted, both with a “K-Score” of 5 out of a possible 
10, with 3 criteria classified as “significant diplomatic threats”: 
namely, sustainability, adaptability, and neutrality. 
Our comparator intervention (“Intervention B”) is 
implemented via a combination of voluntary counseling and 
testing, post-test support services, antiretroviral treatment, 
and community mobilization, as well as utilizing strategies 
such as; “abstinence, be faithful, and condomize” (ABC), 
which represent interventions with both health and non-
health agendas,13 and scores highly on the K-Score (9 out 
of 10, with 3 criteria classified as “significant diplomatic 
advantages”) but is less cost-effective (US$5000 per HIV 
infection averted). Such an intervention has been initially 
evaluated from the outset of study design for effect on 
diplomatic and foreign policy outcomes, as well as standard 
health and medical metrics.1 More specifically, challenges 
to (non-damaging) local customs have been mitigated, 
sustainability has been ensured; downstream and side-effects 
have all been considered as part of the original assessment 
plan. Effects on local perceptions of donors, cultural, and 
religious acceptability, and the anticipation of long-terms 
intervention issues have also been considered on a prima facie 
basis.
Results 
Finally, we take the United Nations (UN) international 
statistical standard for population health metrics of 100 000 
susceptible persons suffering from a generalized HIV epidemic 
(prevalence 10% and incidence 2%). Total number of HIV 
infections, therefore, currently stand at 10 000 and increase 
(excluding annual HIV-related deaths) at a rate of 2000 per 
year. The implementation of intervention A, under a fixed 
budget of US$1 000 000, would, in this theoretical framework, 
avert 333 HIV infections in the first year of implementation 
or 16.6% of new infections. Conversely, intervention B[1] 
would avert 200 infections or 10%. Our question then 
becomes: is the difference in the number of HIV infections 
averted (133 infections or 6.6% of new infections) offset 
by diplomatic gains, including but not limited to; (1) their 
potential to attract additional funds to intervention B, thereby 
increasing the funding envelope (eg, increases in support for 
antiretroviral and other global health interventions at the turn 
of the century),14 (2) the possible health gains consequent on 
increased long-term utilization via the performance of the 
sustainability, visibility, and cultural acceptability criteria15 
for intervention B, and (3) at the most abstract level, the 
(nebulous and possibly unquantifiable) health gains and lives 
saved as a result of improved international relations between 
donor and recipient countries.16 
If these possible benefits can be shown to equal or 
exceed the 133 HIV infections that the original choice 
of intervention B failed to avert, the case for preferring 
investment in intervention B is strengthened. Let us assume 
that, for example, the diplomatic success of the intervention 
resulted in a doubling of funding for intervention B (from 
US$1 000 000 to US$2 000 000), thereby also doubling the 
number of HIV infections averted (from 200 to 400). This 
means that, in comparison to the choice of staying with the 
“less diplomatic” intervention A, an additional 67 HIV/
AIDS infections (or 20% of all new infections) are averted in 
the first year of implementation. Such increases in funding 
and support for interventions that capture both donor and 
recipient imaginations, as well as “hearts and minds,” is not 
unprecedented (witness the dramatic mobilization of funding 
for antiretroviral treatment during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
for example17).
Discussion
K-Scores and Cost-Effectiveness Ratios
An additional assumption is the effect of improvements in 
K-Scores on cost-effectiveness ratios. Improved K-Scores are 
not connected to the cost of the intervention (either absolute 
cost or cost per unit of output or outcome). Rather, these 
scores are linked to outcomes. For example, if we accept an 
increase in funding for the intervention by a factor of 20% 
— as a possibly conservative estimate in the context of the 
quadrupling of funding for global health interventions in 
recent years — for each additional K-Score point, outcomes or 
outputs improve in a directly corresponding manner. In this 
example, a differential in K-Scores of 4 implies an increase 
in funding for intervention B of 80%. Based on our initial 
budget of $1 000 000 for intervention B, this would, therefore, 
increase to $1 800 000. This improved budget would, therefore, 
generate a total of 360 HIV infections averted.
Advantages and Disadvantages
As an alternative or complement to traditional CEA for 
global health, the development and application of diplomatic 
thresholds has both advantages and disadvantages. Positives 
include the development and selection of more sensitive, 
sustainable and “diplomatic” global health interventions that 
advance, for example, international relations, cooperation 
stability, security and conflict resolution – the broader 
interests of the global community – without sacrificing 
the primary altruistic, humanitarian, and development 
goals of international medical assistance measures. 
Possible disadvantages include the need for additional 
design considerations for global health interventions that 
integrate these concerns, rather than, as in the past, simply 
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developing an effective or cost-effective intervention and 
proceeding directly to implementation. The feasibility of 
these pre-implementation checks should also be considered 
– is it realistic for bilateral and multilateral donors, as well 
as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to undertake 
“diplomatic evaluation” checks, via a checklist or electronic 
app, on their efforts on both a pre-hoc and post-hoc basis? 
Many would, however, consider these added bureaucratic 
and administrative hurdles a small price to pay for the dual 
advancement of diplomatic and development goals in a 
synergistic fashion.
Conclusions
In this example, the KT is based on an increase in funding 
envelopes contingent on the fulfillment of diplomatic criteria. 
It is hard, but not impossible, to support this assertion. It is 
also, perhaps, no coincidence that the ascendancy of global 
health interventions which are likely to score highly in terms 
of K-Scores (eg, antiretroviral treatment and voluntary 
counseling and testing) coincided with a period of dramatic 
growth in global health funding.18 Conversely, in latter years, 
the focus towards less emotive efforts was linked, again perhaps 
coincidentally, with more cost-effective but potentially less 
diplomatic efforts.19,20 The “threshold” is, therefore, based 
on considerations such as the capacity to attract funding. In 
practice, the KT can, therefore, be defined as “the point at 
which diplomatic outcomes, including sustainability, cultural 
awareness and other considerations, increase intervention 
funding, momentum, utilization and support to such an 
extent that the total number of HIV infections averted equals 
or exceeds those of alternative HIV infections, with better 
cost-effectiveness in controlled, rather than ‘real world,’ 
long-term settings.” The consideration of the KT in resource 
allocation decisions and global health intervention selection, 
therefore, stands to simultaneously advance diplomatic and 
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Endnote
[1] The “lifetime cost savings” for Interventions A and B are assumed, for the 
purposes of this model, to be the same.
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